Exploring the historiography of the International Crisis Group (ICG), this article looks critically at the narratives surrounding the organisation's self-declared success. The focus is specifically on the so-called ICG methodology consisting of field-based research and analysis, practical policy recommendations and high-level advocacy.
Introduction
The International Crisis Group (ICG) is a success story. According to its website, it developed from 'a two-person office in London, and a tiny field staff in the Balkans and West Africa' in the mid-1990s into 'the world's leading independent, non-partisan, source of analysis and advice to governments, and intergovernmental bodies like the United Nations, European Union and World Bank, on the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict'.
1 It has been celebrated by key figures in international politics lauding the ICG for its work. They describe the organisation as an 'influential and inspiring voice' and 'the eyes, the ears and the This article looks critically at the ICG methodology and its underlying assumptions.
Conceptually, it combines Edgar Schein's work on organisational culture and leadership, especially his analytical distinction between three levels of organisational culture (artefacts, espoused values and beliefs, and underpinning basic assumptions), with Dvora Yanow's work on organisational and policy myths in order to examine, more closely, the ideas that drive the ICG methodology. 8 Excavating the underpinning implicit assumptions of the ICG's culture permits a critical exploration of its explicit storylines and artefacts, which are manifest in the form of its information products. Through this lens it is possible to reveal and products (reports, briefings, crisis alerts). It will be argued that the ICG methodology contains a number of organisational myths that are designed to mask these tensions that, if publicly discussed, would perhaps raise questions about the organisation's expert authority.
The four myths looked at in detail are the 'field facts myth', the 'myth of flexible pragmatism', the 'myth of uniqueness' and the 'neutrality/independence myth'. The tensions/incommensurable values that these myths veil are tensions between problem orientation and success orientation in the ICG's knowledge production, between its moral claims and its lack of a clearly defined moral standpoint, and between its claims of independence and non-partisanship that clash with its entanglements in the international policy community. These tensions are built into the ICG's organisational culture and cannot be easily dissolved, and they explain contradictions in the group's practices and products as well as why the ICG is lauded by some (former) staff members and outside observers and yet loathed by others. The ICG's organisational myths, constantly reiterated and reproduced in its self-referential products, ensure that these tensions are not openly discussed, as they would undermine the group's expert authority. As such they are often not recognised by knowledge consumers, who are unaware of their implications for the production of so-called truths.
Organisational culture and organisational myths 4 The culture of an organisation is both a 'set of structures, routines, rules, and norms that guide and constrain behavior' (a relatively stable structure defining what actors can legitimately do) and at the same time 'a dynamic phenomenon that surrounds us at all times, constantly enacted and created by our interactions with others and shaped by leadership behavior'. 9 As a structure, it consists of shared basic assumptions acquired by a group over time and maintained through socialisation. 10 Consequently, in order to understand an organisation's observable behaviour patterns it is crucial to understand its culture.
Schein differentiates between three levels of organisational culture, 11 the first (and surface) level being artefacts. These include the visible structures and processes of an organisation, the architecture of its physical environment, its style, emotional displays, 20 An organisational or policy myth is defined as 'a narrative created and believed by a group of people that diverts attention away from a puzzling part of their reality'. 21 Such myths have a narrative form in that they are 'not propositions of logic or arguments of rhetoric', even though they usually consist of matter-of-fact statements. 22 As social constructions, myths are public, rooted in particular cultures, times and spaces and reality for those who believe in and reiterate them. 23 Most importantly, '[c]onstructing the myth is not done explicitly or necessarily with the intention of deceiving or manipulating; rather, the myth is a product of tacit knowledge that is created tacitly and communicated tacitly'. 24 Its function is to veil tensions between incommensurable values that would create turmoil if spoken or discussed publicly, for example by undermining an organisation's legitimacy and authority. 25 As a narrative, we can expect to find policy myths at the level of espoused values and beliefs of an organisation; the tensions between values, which the myths veil, are located at the level of the basic often-unspoken underlying assumptions.
In the following three sections, close-up readings of the ICG's self-narrative and historiography are combined with background information about its founders and insights from interviews with long-term members/founders in order to explore some of the deeper assumptions of the ICG and their manifestation at the levels of espoused beliefs and values (anniversary brochure, website) and artefacts (ICG products). The focus of the study will be on the tensions between the three main elements of the ICG's methodology: field-based analysis, policy prescriptions and high-level advocacy. Despite an emphasis on field research and analysis, there is also a lack of information about the ICG's concrete research methods. 'Being in the field' as such does not say much about methods of data collection and interpretation. In this way, the organisation circumvents a central standard of academic field research-based knowledge production: the intersubjective traceability of the research process, which would also have to include discussions of the quality of information and reliability of sources (for example, whether information was triangulated). This latter point is especially important in view of different actors trying to shape the perceptions of post-/conflict spaces in the 'battlefield of ideas', sometimes through one-sided or wrong information. 33 For the ICG field analyst, this might not be as problematic as for the outside observer.
Many staff members have a professional background in academia and most probably adhere to field research standards by default, even though this is not made explicit in ICG information products for the sake of readability or informant protection. Referring to a report on Serbia in 2000 that provided an analysis based on out-dated fieldwork data and whose predictions turned out to be 'dead wrong', the anniversary brochure suggests that accuracy of information is crucial for the ICG's reputation and role. In this particular instance, the ICG had 'failed because it had strayed from its core methods, and [ICG President] Evans and others in the organisation took the wake-up call to heart.' 34 Against this background, it can be assumed that the ICG's field research usually aims at producing what Rüb has called 8 'problem-oriented knowledge', that is, knowledge that is interested in explaining and understanding a given problem as 'accurately' as possible. 35 Nevertheless, in the process of translating the problem-oriented knowledge produced in the field into policy recommendations, this knowledge does change its character because it is transformed into 'success-oriented knowledge'. 36 In other words, knowledge and prescriptions have to be compatible with the world of policy-makers. According to its annual report:
In the initial drafting of reports and briefing papers, field analysts work with our regional program directors. A research and advocacy team in Brussels also provides input, especially on EU and NATO developments, while our Washington and New
York advocacy offices assist with U.S. and UN perspectives, supplementing our national and regional advocacy in Beijing, Istanbul, Johannesburg, Nairobi and elsewhere. The policy prescriptions attached to Crisis Group reports are settled with input from field and senior staff, and Board members, as well as consultation with governments, inter-governmental organisations, academics and other think-tanks and NGOs. 37 The medium of translation is by means of discussions among different groups within (and sometimes outside of) the organisation -the ICG's second mode of establishing 'reality and truth'. According to a senior staff member of an ICG advocacy office, internal discussion is the central method in the process from initial field report draft to final published product:
There is a volume of exchange, internal exchange, in Crisis Group that's -enormous. The 'truth' that finally makes it into published ICG products, especially its executive summaries and policy recommendations, is thus ultimately defined within the ICG as 'that which survives conflicts and debates' 39 . Problem-oriented knowledge established through field research forms the basis for such discussions, but only gains the quality of advocacycompatible expert knowledge through extensive exchange of different views. This is judged by the long-term staff member quoted above as one of the ICG's central strengths:
[T]his is an organisation that gives you a lot of intellectual freedom. There is very little censorship.
[…] We have disagreements, you know, all the time. It's absolutely not uniform, and sometimes we're pissed off, and sometimes we lose an argument, that's for sure, but at the same time there is commitment. 40 The underlying idea of inviting as many perspectives as possible on a report is 'to strengthen the product and make it as good as we can'. 41 'Strong' and 'good' is defined in success-oriented terms, however, rather than in problem-oriented ones: it is a product which has a chance to have influence on policy-making within a given context of existing political positions and whose unintended repercussions are minimal.
While the ICG's notion of 'field research' and 'analysis' as part of its 'methodology' uses the terminology of, and evokes associations with, academic research standards, the symbolic charging derived from 'being in the field' as such and 'witnessing the situation on the ground' seems to be just as important for the organisation's perception as the actual contents of the analysis. Field presence bestows a particular, especially valuable, form of expert authority upon the ICG, and this function relatively increases in importance in the process of transforming problem-oriented knowledge into success-oriented knowledge. 42 In the logic of knowledge markets, success orientation ultimately trumps problem orientation, as it is only 'marketable knowledge', or knowledge that is compatible with key policy-makers'
frames, values and positions with regard to central storylines, which will ensure a knowledge entrepreneur access to and influence on the policy-making process. 43 The following quote by Problem solving and successful advocacy may not be compatible in any case, and this potentially strong tension between the two values sometimes comes to the fore in the ICG's artefacts, for example, whenever there are visible gaps between the analytical and policyoriented parts of a report. 46 With reference to environmental movements, Maarten Hajer has shown that groups influencing governments are 'haunted by the dilemma of whether to argue on the terms set by the government or to insist on their own mode of expression. In the latter case, of course, they run the risk of loosing [sic] direct influence and therefore they often barter their expression freedom for influence on concrete policy-making.' 47 This is the very problem the ICG faces: by subordinating its knowledge production to success orientation, its work is more likely to put a lid on radical ideas than to promote them. The ICG's selfnarrative, however, tends to gloss over this tension at the heart of its knowledge production, emphasising the direct, untainted transmission of on-the-ground facts to high-level policymakers:
Crisis Group provides information to mid-and top-level decision-makers by directing that from-the-ground data directly to them. The organisation has a large number of field-based analysts gathering information, and it hands that knowledge and analysis to all levels of government and international organisations […] . In short, Crisis Group cuts out the middle men in the information chain, and this leads to better informed policies. 48 This narrative of the unspoiled, unaltered and authentic 'on-the-ground facts'
informing conflict-related policies is the myth repeated over and over in publications and
interviews that masks what looms as a potential problem for the ICG's legitimacy: the undermining of its expert authority based on field research by its ultimately success-oriented outlook in an international knowledge and advocacy market.
Moralist without high ground? The ICG's flexible pragmatism
An organisation whose mission it is to 'prevent and resolve deadly conflict' is obviously built on a moral claim that violent mass conflicts are unacceptable and that their occurrence not only justifies, but actually demands political action to forestall or end (imminent) violence.
This moral foundation also crops up in the self-image of long-term ICG staff, in which 'integrity' and 'commitment' differentiate them from other actors involved in international conflict management, as the following interview passage illustrates:
A lot of people like me worked for Crisis Group, then left and then came backbecause we like it. It's a good job; it's a good organisation. People have integrity.
[…]
This is not the case at the UN or in political organisations, in other multilateral organisations. Everyone in Crisis Group is committed: to the organisation, to the goal of the organisation, to conflict prevention, conflict resolution, but at the same time committed to the people that live and suffer in the situations that we cover.
[…]. They are all experts. They all have, I wouldn't say roots, but they all have affinities, they all have developed relationships with people in the various conflict situations. So it's a double commitment to… to not do too much harm, you know, on the ground, and also to the ideal and the goal of the organisation. 49 Against this background, an interesting observation is that the organisation tends to resist any form of characterisation, which includes distinguishing it not only from policyimplementing NGOs, but also from explicitly norm-based international NGOs such as Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International, which work through moral authority based 12 on fixed, non-negotiable values (human rights, political rights). 50 As the ICG's anniversary brochure recalls with regard to the organisation's founding principles:
In many respects the new Group was unique for what is was not: it was not designed to deliver humanitarian assistance; it was not a mediating body; it was not a human rights organisation, and it was not adverse to recommending international military intervention to end conflicts. 51 The ICG's moral claim is closely linked to the idea that it advocates on behalf of the victims of violent conflict. 52 The two men debated why it had been so difficult for the international system to effectively respond to Bosnia and other conflicts. An idea was hatched: to create an independent organisation that would serve as the world's eyes and ears on the ground in countries in conflict while pressing for immediate action. The concept of the International Crisis Group was born. and analysis. 59 His biographer, Scott Anderson, describes him as a person with a thirst for knowledge that served as his 'weapon' when working in disaster zones. Not only did he read everything he could gather about a place before starting a job; once on the ground he also 'asked questions of whoever crossed his path, from presidents to schoolteachers to illiterate peasant farmers, as he constantly took pulse and tried to learn more'. 60 Both Soros and Cuny shared the belief that crisis represented opportunity to foster change, a belief that explains their enthusiasm to help Abramowitz build up a completely new type of organisation filling an international information gap and seizing possibilities for political influence on conflict management that had emerged in the radically changed, postbipolar international landscape of the 1990s. To date, the ICG reiterates this image as a completely different actor in its 'uniqueness myth'. Soros and Cuny also agreed that governments and international organisations often represented an obstacle rather than the solution in tackling societal problems and injustices including mass-scale violence, 61 an idea visible to date in the ICG's 'lack of political will' storyline according to which solutions to violent conflict are often available, but are hampered by a lack of political will to implement them. 62 
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What also resulted from these early instances of cooperation is a rather simplifying view of wars and other forms of mass violence, which has to be read against the background of the Sarajevo siege and, later, the genocide in Rwanda. Anderson suggests that for Cuny the Bosnian war […] was about the most fundamental, black and white principles: not about Bosnians and Serbs, or Muslims and Christians, or even about the right to self-determination.
Rather, it was a struggle between the forces of civilization and barbarism, and the rest of the world's failure to see it in those terms and act was a failure not just of will or vision but of the most fundamental morality. have been a mantra for some, but it didn't seem to be an actionable policy for anyone. 64 There is a certain absence of ambiguity in the depictions of mass violence and the availability of clear policy solutions visible in these quotes that characterise the ICG's selfnarrative and methodology to date. Not only are the solutions to conflict not as easily available as is suggested in the ICG narrative. Indeed, the very nature of conflict is less straightforward and unambiguous than these readings suggest.
The 'knowledge turn' in conflict and peacebuilding literature over the last decade has revealed the complexity of violent conflict not only in material terms, but also in terms of its intelligibility for both outside observers and involved actors alike. Veit, for instance, highlights the informational uncertainty that characterised the situation in the DR Congo, recalling that as he 'had the opportunity to speak to MONUC officials, militia leaders, and many other interviewees, it appeared to him that most of the time he took part in an ongoing process of interpretation of the respective other'. 65 Meanings may not be fixed and their (lack of) establishment part of the conflict itself. Other authors have shown, through different approaches, that the ways in which a violent conflict is imagined or framed, and how its causes and dynamics are made sense of through narratives that establish causal and temporal links, have a crucial impact on the 'tools' and 'solutions' adopted by intervening actors. 66 In addition, supposedly shared basic concepts such as sovereignty can have completely different meanings for different actors involved. 67 Finally, no matter how committed and informed outside actors are, there are structural reasons and immanent logics that keep the 'international-local gap' in peacebuilding interventions from being bridged. It is not suggested here that ICG analysts have simplified understandings of the conflicts they are experts on; on the contrary, we can assume that their access to networks and information provide them with differentiated knowledge of the 'situation on the ground' and that they are aware of the challenges of intelligibility and interpretation of conflict.
Nonetheless, the ICG methodology and self-narrative wittingly or unwittingly uphold the storyline of the readability of conflicts and the availability of practical solutions. The possibility of unambiguous moral judgements of blame and victimhood, based on the facts of the field, forms the basis for this storyline and is therefore an integral part of the set of nonnegotiable beliefs at the heart of the ICG culture. That 'field facts' most often do not lend themselves to unambiguous conclusions, but are rather characterised by complexities and ensuing dilemmas in the choice of policies, is a tension in the ICG's organisational culture that is not discussed publicly in its self-advertising publications.
This tension is also not attenuated by an explicit normative standpoint that would make the ICG's judgements easily traceable. Its moral claim of 'working to prevent and resolve deadly conflict' lacks any foundation other than the belief in being able to judge situations of mass violence correctly based on 'facts' and to derive the 'right' policies from these judgements. Not explicitly subscribing to norms such as human rights, liberal democracy or good governance, even though these norms undoubtedly play a central role in ICG reports and recommendations, serve the ICG's image as independent, non-partisan actor.
Yet as policy recommendations always include normative-practical judgement, which cannot be made without some sort of normative standpoint, this neutrality is ultimately a myth. Not surprisingly, many critics have targeted the question of the organisation's implicit normative foundations, pointing to its deep roots in (neo)liberal governmentality. 70 What these studies have also shown is the depoliticising effect on the understanding of violence that goes hand in hand with the ICG's mission and reporting: violence (apart from that exerted by external interveners to end existing one) is represented as a societal pathology and not even taken into consideration as a means of political struggle. This is also expressed in staff members' perceived moral superiority over other international organisations' staff in terms of integrity and commitment. At the same time, however, the ICG's access to and possible influence on policy-making are dependent on the staff's formal and informal professional networks in this very policy community and on its Board of Trustees members' symbolic value and functional links. 73 In combination with the lack of a clear normative standpoint, this entanglement with the international policy community creates a constant need for the ICG to show its 'impact' on policy-makers and policy processes from agenda setting to policy formulation to implementation, as visible in the ICG's annual reports and on its website.
The potentially strong tensions between its moral claim and lack of an explicit standpoint and between the neutrality/independence claim and the group's political entanglements are ultimately veiled by the ICG's pragmatic flexibility myth:
Crisis Group is unencumbered by ideology, competing national interests or private gain, owing allegiance first and foremost to the facts on the ground. It aims to use all political and diplomatic tools available to further its mission of conflict prevention and resolution […] .
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In the ICG's narrative, it is exactly the lack of an explicit moral standpoint that makes the organisation truly independent, non-partisan and flexible with regard to the political tools it may recommend, and again it is the 'field facts myth' that serves to uphold this claim.
Conclusion
The ICG's organisational self-representation and behaviour is based on a number of nonnegotiable underpinning assumptions, which are characterised by tensions between incommensurable values or beliefs. The first main tension concerns the two different logics that, beneath the surface, drive the ICG's analysis and advocacy and produce two different, sometimes incompatible, kinds of knowledge. In general terms, field analysis tends to produce problem-oriented knowledge based on values such as analytical accuracy and comprehensiveness, while policy recommendations are rather driven by success orientation, that is, geared to ensure access to and influence on policy-makers. This manifests at the level of artefacts: not only do analyses and recommendations often not match neatly; at times, there seems to be an outright gap between differentiated analysis and formulaic policy advice. 75 As the market approach to political knowledge production suggests, knowledge entrepreneurs' success orientation, which presupposes knowledge that is 'marketable' and 'compatible' with policy-makers' ideas, values and positions, ultimately trumps problem orientation. This explains why the ICG's policy recommendations so often remain within the well-known frames and toolboxes of liberal international policy-making, despite the organisation's claim to also think outside of the box. 76 The myth constructed to cover up this tension is that of the direct, unfiltered link between field research-based knowledge and policy advice and advocacy, or the 'field facts myth', backed up by the self-image of a unique organisation sui generis.
The second main tension exists between the organisation's claim of moral authority -'working to prevent and resolve deadly conflict' -and the lack of a clearly defined normative standpoint from which to make this claim. This rather blurry foundation in an opposition to Taken together, the ICG's organisational myths of field facts, uniqueness, neutrality/independence and pragmatic flexibility, inscribed in the 'ICG methodology', are the backbone of the organisation's public expert branding. The tensions masked by these myths, however, crop up from time to time in its artefacts and the voiced assessments of both (former) staff and outside commentators. They loom ahead of the organisation, threatening to undermine the symbolic sources of its largely unquestioned expert authority, if discussed publicly. For consumers of ICG products, this means that there are caveats attached to its information and often high-quality analyses, and specific care should be taken in terms of subscription to the ICG methodology narrative, which, as was shown in this article, is honeycombed with myths.
